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The Political Logic of Victim Impact Statements 
BRIAN ROSEBURY 
 
The guilty get a good run in our judicial system while victims can be a dirty word. It's the 
world turned upside down. . . . 
Prominent defence lawyer Rob Stary, a member of the Law Institute's Criminal Law Section, 
believes victim impact statements provide the opportunity to find out how the victim feels. . . . 
“They are cathartic in their nature, they're helpful for the victim to articulate their position—
and that's important—and allow the judge when they're determining penalty to understand the 
immediate long-term consequences,'' he explained. “Most judges, despite a view that they are 
removed from the community, in fact are highly sensitive to the impact upon victims. That's 
reflected in sentencing comments all over the place.'' 




I Introduction: a political context 
 
In this paper I discuss three aspects of the continuing debate over the use of Victim Impact 
Statements (VIS) in criminal proceedings. I aim to show, in each case, the dependence of key 
arguments in favor of VIS on presuppositions that can be characterized as political, in the 
sense that they enter the debate not so much through argumentation internal to the ethics of 
 2 
criminal justice, as through the influence of a wider popular and media consensus about the 
entitlements of a citizen and the failings of the criminal justice system. I will focus primarily 
upon those arguments for VIS that frame them within a discourse of “justice” rather than 
“welfare,” but I will acknowledge and distinguish the latter when necessary. I hope that one 
contribution of the paper will be to assist clarification of the distinction, and to promote 
reconsideration of the weight each type of justification can carry. 
An intimate relationship between the discourses of criminal justice and of the wider 
political realm is inevitable and indeed desirable. Both are informed by the attempts of people 
of goodwill to think rationally about deep and contested moral values, while keeping in clear 
view the general and specific facts of human life. We should set aside, plausible though it 
may sometimes seem, the notion of a wholly irrational popular sentiment beating down upon, 
and potentially corroding, the sober deliberations of the legislators and the courts. Instead I 
want to show, by evaluating certain arguments for VIS, that they are open to objections that 
can be successfully refuted if, and only if, influential, and rather specific, political 
presuppositions are brought to their aid. I do not aim to disprove or discredit these 
presuppositions, only to demonstrate their role in the case for VIS, though I believe we may 
think differently about the moral and political context of VIS if the analysis is accepted. 
What are these presuppositions, and how have they arisen? In contemporary western 
culture, most people believe that our social and political apparatus, including law, has value 
to the extent that it serves or facilitates individual well-being. The individual life is the locus 
of value; social goods are ultimately reducible to an aggregate of individual goods. This is not 
a universal or necessary view, and various conservative, religious, and communitarian 
traditions offer alternatives, mainly by affirming the existence of intrinsic or irreducibly 
social goods,
2
 or by assailing the concept of individual autonomy. But it is the dominant 
belief, natural to a liberal democracy. And within it, often only loosely corresponding to 
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political party allegiances, there are two distinct views of the role of the state and other public 
agencies in contributing to individual goods. Both assume that individual human beings are, 
by and large, rational decision makers: but they take different views of the kind of society to 
that our rational decision making should lead us, and that in turn can best support our future 
choices. The crucial difference, simply stated, is that one view envisages (and prefers) a 




On the first view, broadly identifiable with market liberalism, the members of the 
society are viewed as an aggregate of rationally self-interested and inherently competitive 
individuals, each seeking his or her due, and pursuing his or her preferences. Economic 
activity is regulated by law, in order that the competition among individuals is fair and 
peaceful, but admits as little intervention by the state or other collective agencies as is 
consistent with the safe and effective operation of the market. Thanks to the invisible hand of 
the market, all—more or less—benefit from the competitiveness of each. The moral 
imperative governing our activity in the economic sphere is to compete lawfully as an 
individual, honoring contracts and expecting fair reward. To combine with others, except in 
the context of contractual relationships among persons, such as those between buyer and 
seller or employer and employee, is morally questionable on two counts: we surrender dignity 
and autonomy, and we fall under suspicion of seeking to distort the market, through cartels or  
the intrusion of political power. 
Market liberalism has its origins in classical economics, but took on its distinctive 
present-day political character in the later twentieth century, in reaction against the apparent 
spread and prestige of centrally-directed economic systems, most menacingly exemplified by 
the Soviet Union. Political economists such as Hayek and Friedman criticized state 
intervention in the market, not merely for compromising its efficiency as a mechanism for 
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expressing individual choice, but as necessitating definite repressions of liberty. A system of 
state intervention, in the name of welfare, redistribution or “positive liberty,” would empower 
a governing elite, liable to “declare almost any interest a general interest and . . . make large 
numbers serve purposes in which they are not in the least interested” [italics added].4 To this 
analysis, the libertarianism of Nozick added the claim that distributions resulting from lawful 
free market activity were ipso facto just, and that government intervention in pursuit of a 
planned distribution could not but violate individual rights.
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 At a popular level, these beliefs 
have helped to form a consensus, or at least a widespread sentiment, that the state and its tax-
funded agencies (“big government”) stand in natural opposition to our individual interests 
and wishes. In this discourse, the idea that the agencies of the public realm might be serving 
to advance our collective interests, not least by limiting and policing the economic power of 
the very rich, is ignored or debunked. Indeed, market-dominant private media interests are 
able to cast themselves as opponents of an “establishment” that comprises “institutions 
hungry for power at the expense of ordinary citizens.”6  
The alternative, social liberalism, rejects market liberalism‟s identification of 
collective action with institutional coercion. Social liberalism emphasizes the capacity of 
rational individuals to choose to act collectively, whether through voluntary organizations 
such as labor unions, or, as willing taxpayers and compliant citizens, by suspending or 
subordinating the competitive pursuit of individual goods in deference to public institutions 
supposed to facilitate the good of all. Since a degree of self-abnegation, at least in the short 
term, seems to be required if individual choices are to be pooled in this way to sustain 
collective action, social liberalism needs to explain why such a sacrifice is justified, and 
indeed psychologically possible, if all good is individual good. It may appeal, for example, to 
a Rawlsian moral psychology, in which just institutions enjoy popular consent precisely in 
virtue of their manifest justice (“justice” understood, at least in part, as the assurance of due 
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care for the welfare of all individuals including the least fortunate).
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 Or it may appeal to the 
recognition—most commonly expressed today in the discussion of environmental policy—
that uncoordinated choices can be self-defeating, that an aggregate of purely individually-
motivated choices can create outcomes that nobody wants.
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 For social liberals, markets are 
not expected to convert individual competition into outcomes more or less good for all. 
Rather, the moral imperative for each of us is to aim for the best outcomes, judging whether 
these are most likely to be secured by our own individual action, or by subsuming our action 
into that of a group or public institution.  
There can be little doubt that in the period between the election of Ronald Reagan as 
US President in 1980 and the economic collapse of 2008, the market-liberal view gained 
strength, winning adherents widely among the intelligentsia, in active political life, and in the 
media. I will argue that the rise of VIS is intimately related to this development. It is 
connected to the idea of members of society as competitively seeking their personal good, as 
they themselves define it, against the background of a diminished expectation that they 
should repose their confidence in public institutions. 
Why would it matter if this claim proved to be true? On one view, it would matter 
very little, except to historians of ideas. It would, at most, provide an example of an idea in 
one field becoming a stronger candidate for acceptance because of the presuppositions it 
shares with other, increasingly widely-accepted, beliefs. On another view, it would matter 
considerably. It might be a bad thing for the criminal law, for example (that is, for the respect 
in which it is held), that it should come to be seen primarily as an arena in which individuals 
struggle to get their due.  
That there is some affinity between the case for VIS and the values of market 
liberalism may seem obvious, since the assertion of individual entitlements and preferences 
plays a key role in both.
9
 The main contribution of this paper will be to analyze more fully 
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the structures of (sometimes implicit) argument that unite the presuppositions needed to 
defend VIS with those of market liberalism, in particular its anti-collectivism and anti-statism. 
Whatever substantive philosophical interest the paper may possess will lie in these analyses 
(sections IV-VI); the much shorter sections that precede and follow these three are intended 
to provide some necessary context, and to suggest, more polemically, a relation to continuing 
wider political debate and conflict.  
Before leaving the wider political context for the present, it is worth heading off one 
misunderstanding right away. To maintain that there are logical connections between VIS and 
market liberalism is not to deny that the victim‟s “voice” can be enlisted for policy initiatives 
that are not “liberal” in any sense. This is the theme of Markus Dirk Dubber‟s (2004) study of 
the victims‟ rights movement in the USA. Dubber argues that the political success of the 
movement in the 1980s was compromised by its assimilation to “the war on crime” . . . a 
“mass incapacitation campaign” aimed at perceived antisocial elements, and carried out 
through an expansion of “the state‟s system of criminal administration.” Dubber traces this 
development to a “state-centered, preconstitutional” model of criminal justice, inherited from 
eighteenth-century England.
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 But, even according to his own account, there was no logical 
connection between this authoritarian project and the vindication of victims‟ rights: the 
connection, as he puts it, was merely one of “fact,” not “principle,” with public indignation 
over the suffering of victims providing political cover for aggressive, class-driven measures 
of social control, unconnected to any direct redress for victims.
11
 In contrast, when Dubber 
begins to defend what he believes to be “the legitimate core of victims‟ rights” [italics added], 
his own anti-statist individualism is at once apparent. 
 
For too long, American criminal law has been run by the state in the name of  
ill-defined “public interests.” . . . Crime is not a public health issue but a  
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Dubber is unusual among skeptics about VIS in interpreting its rise as much in the light of the 
first assertion as of the second, and in viewing it with suspicion for that reason. As we shall 
see—and as might be expected—among sympathetic accounts of VIS, it is the second remark 
that is more characteristic.  
II  Distinguishing the functions of the victim statement 
An important preliminary step is to “unpack” the ambiguous concept of VIS by identifying 
certain distinct aspects of victim input that may inhere in the same actual victim utterance  
(1) Victim Impact Evidence (VIE) 
In its aspect as Victim Impact Evidence, the function of the victim utterance is to inform the 
court of the harm actually caused by the offense to its immediate victim, or to other persons 
closely affected such as family members or rescue workers. Any other purposes that may be 
simultaneously served by the victim utterance are not relevant to “strict VIE” as I will call it. 
The victim, so far as strict VIE is concerned, has no special human status as a participant in 
the court proceedings. Though it may be necessary for her to narrate her experiences, or 
express psychological states such as emotions, her impact evidence is on the same footing as 
non-expressive evidence, such as clinical evidence of injuries caused, or quantitative 
assessments of damage to property. The victim‟s role in VIE is similar to that of a witness, 
though her statements qualify as VIE only to the extent that they are directed to the harm she 
has suffered as a result of the crime.  
(2) Victim Opinion Statements (VOS) 
In a very few jurisdictions, victims or their survivors have been permitted to express opinions 
on the crime and on the proper penalty for the convicted offender. Such opinions, strictly 
understood, are not evidence, but are a judgment, passed from a distinctive perspective, on 
 8 
the implications of the evidence. In contrast to VIE, the especially relevant status of the 
victim or her survivors is precisely what justifies the admission of VOS. Indirectly, of course, 
VOS may reveal evidence of the victim impact suffered, and in practice (strict) VIE and 
(strict) VOS may be blended in the same utterance, but the courts must be presumed to be 
able to distinguish opinion from impact evidence and to treat each element appropriately. 
(3) Victim Statements (VS) 
This expression covers all utterances by victims in their capacity as victims that are admitted 
at any stage of the criminal justice process, whether before, during or after court proceedings. 
VIE and VOS are therefore specialized categories of VS. VS may include evidence of harm 
suffered, opinions on the proper penalty, expressions of compassion or forgiveness towards 
the offender, expressions of hatred and indignation, comments on proposals to grant bail or 
parole, attempts at reconciliatory or restorative dialogue and negotiation, complaints about 
the criminal justice processes themselves, and so forth.  
III Justice and welfare justifications of VIS 
The justifications of victim input advanced by its advocates are also varied, but they can 
broadly be divided into two types, those directed to justice and those directed to welfare, or 
utility. On the one hand, VIE is claimed to be of value to the courts since it makes clearer the 
nature and extent of the harm done by the offense, and can therefore “enhance justice . . . 
particularly in terms of sentence proportionality.”13 On the other hand, Victim Statements 
generally, especially when presented in the context of some wider system such as a victim 
support regime or a restorative justice program, are claimed to bring benefit to various parties: 
to the victim or victim‟s survivors, to the offender, whose understanding of his crime and its 
effects may enhance his rehabilitation, and to society as a whole through the reduced 
alienation and increased co-cooperativeness of victims, and the introduction of a healing 
element into the management of criminal justice.
14
 Edna Erez notes a range of therapeutic or 
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empowering effects recorded by victims. These include, inter alia: experiencing a “cathartic 
effect” after providing impact information; discharging their “civil duty”; redressing the 
“unequal balance” between themselves and the offender introduced by the crime; asserting 
“ownership of the conflict,” which they may have “felt was misappropriated from them in the 
name of the state”; being able “to remind judges of the fact that behind the crime is a real 
person who is a victim”; and, in the case of the survivors of murder victims, fulfilling a 
compelling need to “represent the interests of their beloved one in the case.”15  
Erez mentions the rare permissions of Victim Opinion Statements only in a footnote 
and without comment. One might suppose from this that victim opinion is rarely 
communicated, and it is true that even in those jurisdictions that have allowed VOS, such as 
Arizona, its use has been challenged on appeal, and that in most jurisdictions victim 
statements may not include proposals as to penalty. However, this picture is somewhat 
misleading because of the ease with which the logical distinction between (strict) VIE and 
(strict) VOS breaks down in rhetorical practice. The public impression in this respect—
namely, that in some high-profile cases victim opinion has been vividly communicated in 
court—is not unfounded. For example, at the trials of the Oklahoma bomber Timothy 
McVeigh and the 9/11 conspirator Zacarias Moussaoui, the presentation of hours of heart-
rending impact evidence by victims‟ survivors, in the context of prosecution calls for the 
death penalty, made it superfluous for the participants to breach the rules by formally 
expressing their opinions on the appropriate sentence. They had, in effect, expressed an 
opinion by their decision to appear. The same is no less true of those whose statements, as in 
the case of McVeigh‟s accomplice Terry Nichols, were called by the defense, and served to 
suggest that victim impact need not imply a capital sentence.
16
  
Notwithstanding these qualms, the initial concern of many opponents of VIS—that 
they would sway courts towards vengeful sentencing—does not seem to have been borne out. 
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Erez and others have produced evidence to suggest that their use has not led to a pattern of 
greater severity in sentencing.
17
 
I turn now to the three questions.  
 
IV The rejection of the wholly public conception 
The first question concerns a fundamental aspect of our conception of criminal justice. 
As both supporters and critics of VIS have noted, their introduction challenges what might be 
called the wholly public conception, the doctrine that crimes are to be understood as offenses 
against the entire community, to be investigated and chastised by the public authorities, and 
not by, or even on behalf of, individual crime victims. Though classically stated by 
philosophers as different as Hobbes and Hegel,
18
 the wholly public conception became firmly 
entrenched only recently, partly thanks to the administrative reforms that made practicable 
prosecution by the state as a uniform system, and partly as a by-product of the gradual ethical 
and practical repudiation of the reliance on private prosecutions associated with such criminal 
justice regimes as the so-called “Bloody Code” in England.19  
So firmly established in the educated consciousness has the wholly public conception 
been, until quite recently, that one assumes some canonical arguments in its favor must be 
ready to hand. Yet it tends in modern texts to be taken for granted rather than defended—
almost as if to defend it explicitly would be to concede the unnerving possibility of its 
abandonment. In the UK, for example, the Report of the JUSTICE committee on the role of 
the victim in criminal justice (1998) states, but does not argue for, the view that “the 
prosecutor is prosecuting on behalf of the state, not the victim.”20 It adds that “victims can 
find it difficult to understand that the prosecutor‟s role is not to present their case, but to 
prosecute on behalf of the Crown,” implying, without explaining why, that they should be 
brought to understand this.
21
 In 2004, the Irish Minister of Justice felt obliged to reminder a 
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questioner in the Dáil that “Under the Constitution prosecutions are brought in the name of 
the people as a public act against the accused. In this country, as in many other countries, we 
have an adversarial system of trial. . . . The two sides, so to speak, are the people—acting 
through the public prosecution under the Director of Public Prosecutions—on the one hand 
and the accused on the other. It is not a three-cornered contest in which the victim, the 
alleged perpetrator and the people are at opposite ends of a triangle.” Again, no justification 
was offered, beyond the assertion that the existing system was “fair.”22 
I will therefore review what seem to me to be the strongest available arguments in 
favor of the wholly public conception: these, I assume, are the arguments on which its 
defenders, at least tacitly, rely. 
(1) The definitional argument 
 Law is, by definition, a social and institutional phenomenon. A crime, by definition, is a 
breach of the law, not merely an intentional or reckless harm to an individual person or 
persons. (To call it a “wrong” against a person would already be to invoke either the 
impersonal discourse of natural law, or the institutional discourse of positive law.) The 
prosecution of a crime is therefore appropriately a social and not an individual responsibility. 
Measures to repair or compensate the harms incidentally suffered by an individual victim of 
crime may be morally required of the community, but these are a matter for welfare agencies, 
not for the criminal justice process itself. 
Like all definitional arguments, this one is open to the objection that the definition (of 
crime) is not self-justifying, and a sufficiently radical rethink of our terms could lead to its 
abandonment. It could be revised precisely to stipulate that a crime is a special category of 
harm to a person, who may therefore reasonably seek reparation (but need not choose to do 
so, just as one does not always put in an insurance claim): the institutions of criminal justice 
could be reconceived as services to ensure reparation to these individuals when they seek it. 
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Criminal justice on this view would become the mission of a particular public service, and its 
radical distinction from welfare would disappear.  
(2) The communitarian argument 
Individual personhood is at least partly constituted by relations to other persons and to groups 
and communities: each person is “a part of the main,” in Donne‟s words. Conversely, every 
community is at least partly constituted by its members‟ persons. Every crime therefore 
harms, or wrongs, not only an individual, but the community that is interdependent with that 
individual, even if there is no specific collateral harm to other individuals. The decision to 
seek redress and the responsibility for making it effective must therefore, at the very least, be 
shared between the wronged individual and her community.  
Moreover, the expectation of the support of the community when one has been injured 
is an important motive for social co-operation. And the community is in any case more 
powerful than the individual. Therefore the responsibility to prosecute and punish crime, and 
ensure redress for the victim, should lie primarily with the community. Because the 
community is itself harmed by a crime, it may sometimes rightly decide to prosecute even 
when the wronged individual would prefer that it did not.  
It is obvious that in its theory of the relation of individual personhood to other persons 
and to communities, the communitarian argument stands in opposition to liberal 
individualism (or at the other end of a spectrum of conceptions of the relation of the 
individual to society), and it is needless as well as impossible to pursue this deeper theoretical 
debate here.  
However, it is worth noting one vulnerable point in the communitarian argument. If 
we defend the wholly public conception of criminal justice on the grounds that a harm to an 
individual is ipso facto a harm to the community on which the community must act, we need 
to say which kinds of intentional or reckless harm caused by one person to another should be 
 13 
criminalized. The answer to this question cannot be “all of them” (since this would lead to the 
criminalization of millions of minor interpersonal abrasions). We need a justification of the 
designation of certain harms, but not others, as criminal wrongs. If in seeking this we appeal 
to communal judgment, we risk making redress for an individual dependent on some 
contingent sociological fact. For example, it may be argued that a self-conscious group (such 
as women, or a religious or ethnic minority) will perceive a harm to one of their number as 
“their” wrong as well as “her” wrong. Even against the wishes of the harmed individual, the 
community might then properly insist on bringing a prosecution “on her behalf”; and this 
adoption of an individual‟s harm by a particular social group as its concern might serve, by 
way of analogy, to explain and justify the entire community‟s adoption of certain individual 
harms as its concern. But the scope of such adoption by the community of individuals‟ harms 
would always be a sociologically contingent matter (and indeed if it were not, it could not 
function to select some harms and not others). The argument is then open to the criticism that 
it leaves some individual rights at risk, since it is the essence of a political right, as generally 
understood, that it is owned irrespective of the sentiments of the wider community. The 
opponent of the wholly public conception could argue here, therefore, that the communitarian 
argument robs individual victims of sovereignty over “their” cases without providing an 
assured protective intervention in support of their rights.
23
 
(3) The participative equality argument  
All citizens have an equal obligation to obey the law, and to co-operate with its processes by, 
for example, furnishing information to the courts when asked to do so. Except in the case of 
those holding offices within the criminal justice system, who act in those capacities and not 
as private persons, no person must have a specially enhanced power in influencing the 
operation of justice. This prohibition applies no less to victims and offenders than to other 
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citizens. Both are simply expected to serve the criminal justice process by furnishing truthful 
evidence.  
Victims and offenders do indeed have distinctive rights, but they must not be active 
rights of influence over the judicial process itself. Rather they are protective rights, derived 
firstly from the requirements of justice itself (as when the accused person is protected from 
the disclosure of information that might prejudice a jury), and secondly from the objective of 
minimizing the distress caused by the criminal justice processes (as when a vulnerable 
witness is protected from exposure in open court or from aggressive cross-examination). A 
victim is, of course, deserving of additional care from the public authorities, commensurate 
with the harm she has suffered, but this is, again, a matter for welfare, not for criminal justice. 
This argument cuts deeper. To counter it, to justify the abandonment of participative 
equality in favor of giving a victim active rights of influence over the operation of justice in 
“his or her” case, one would have to claim something like this: that the field of operation of 
criminal justice is an aggregate of individual arenas of interest governed by a unified system 
of law, rather than a single wholly public arena in which all have an equal interest. Within his 
or her individual arena of interest, the victim would then have special rights of influence and 
decision. The metaphor that suggests itself for this view of the victim‟s special interest is the 
assertion of ownership over a certain territory, comparable to the enclosure of common land, 
which creates privately owned spaces that are nevertheless subject to universal laws of 
property. Indeed, the phrase „his or her case‟ already implies a private property metaphor. 
(4) The impartiality argument  
It is essential to criminal justice that its agents be free from any personal interest. The refusal 
of active rights of influence to a victim is captured in the dictum that a person must not be “a 
judge in his own case.” As Hegel puts it, the magistrates must be supposed to be guided not 
by any “subjective will,” but by “the universal will of the law.”24 This applies no less to the 
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prosecutor than to the judge. Any admission of the victim, tacitly or explicitly, as co-
prosecutor, as a person with a special interest, is at best redundant to the work of the 
magistrates, and at worst may undermine the consistent application of the law. Indeed, VIS 
may threaten to become a vehicle for private revenge, throwing into reverse the social 
evolution that created the (ideal) objectivity of legal trial and punishment out of the “war of 
each against each,” endemic wherever private retaliation is accepted.  
This argument is the most powerful. It does not deny that victims may feel very 
strongly the desire to take personal action in response to the crime they have suffered. On the 
contrary, it is precisely because it recognizes the power of that desire that it views it as a 
threat to the most objective and consistent justice that is humanly possible. The dangers of 
inconsistency and arbitrariness created by the intervention, however marginal, of victims, 
who are unlikely qua victims to have either the experience or the motive to compare „their‟ 
cases and „their‟ offenders with those of others, are significant ones. 
This fourth argument could be overturned only by a particularly radical version of the 
proposition that victims must have ownership of “their” crimes. Its critic would have to 
maintain that the empowerment of such “ownership” either posed no threat to, or took 
priority over, the aim of achieving the most objective and consistent justice humanly possible. 
 
It is important to note at once that none of these arguments for the wholly public conception 
of criminal justice are telling against strict VIE. In strict VIE, it will be recalled, the victim‟s 
evidence as to harm is simply evidence to be considered alongside other evidence of harm 
(clinical, financial, etc.); the victim participates merely as a witness who is best placed to 
report harm accurately, and has no privileged “voice.” The victim may or may not feel 
gratified at being enabled to present the VIE; such gratification is irrelevant to its purpose. 
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Nor do the four arguments tell against many of the forms of victim support advocated, 
and in many cases introduced, in recent years. In the UK, for example, Helen Reeves and 
Kate Mulley summarized the entitlements they proposed for crime victims under five 
headings. Four of these are: compensation (to restore victims to approximately the same 
financial position as before the crime); protection (against intimidation, harassment, and 
invasions of privacy); services expressly dedicated to their needs, and modeling good practice 
in the treatment of victims to be emulated by other professionals; and clear information at 
each stage of the case. Reeves and Mulley‟s fifth point is that victims should “be free of the 
burden of decisions relating to the offender. This responsibility lies with the state.” Though 
their contention here is motivated by concern for the welfare of the victim as they perceive it, 
rather than by the arguments for denying the victim active rights of influence over 
prosecution or sentencing, it dovetails with them. Reeves and Mulley do support a form of 
VS, partly for its expressive or cathartic value, partly to ensure that relevant information is 
documented, and especially to allow fears of retaliation against the victim by the offender or 
his associates to be heard. They add: “This statement should be taken into consideration 
whenever decisions are made about the case, including cautioning, charging and bail.” 
Though the expression “whenever decisions are made about the case” might seem to 
contradict their view that victims should be shielded from decisions relating to the offender, 
their prime concern is with the victim‟s physical and psychological safety, and they reject the 
use of VIS to influence sentencing.
25
  
The arguments do tell, however, with varying degrees of force, against Victim 
Opinion Statements, since these allow active influence over outcomes to the particular victim, 
who thereby, in virtue of her special relation to the case, enjoys a power denied to all other 
citizens.  
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It is notable that the counter-arguments that are necessary to negate each of the four 
arguments for the wholly public conception have a common factor: they all insist that the 
response to a crime, though discharged through the agency of the criminal justice system 
rather than through private action, should be conceived as, at least partially, belonging to, or 
being conditional on the sovereign choice of, the victim.  
It is striking how prevalent metaphors of ownership are in the advocacy of all versions 
of VIS. They can be traced at least as far back as Nils Christie‟s eccentrically written but 
influential article of 1977, “Conflicts as Property.” Christie advocates “a court procedure that 
restores the participants‟ rights to their own conflicts,” contrasting the alienating 
impersonality of Scandinavian, British and American courts with an episode of domestic 
conflict resolution in a Tanzanian village. “The parties, the former lovers, were in the centre 
of the room and in the centre of everyone‟s attention. . . . It was a happy happening. . . . It 
was circus. It was drama. It was a court case.” Christie does not state and confront arguments 
in favor of the wholly public conception. Rather, he renders them irrelevant by a strategy that 
is to recur in later campaigning for VIS: he represents the assumption of criminal justice by 
the impersonal state as a kind of expropriation of the victims by professionals, especially 
lawyers. “Should lawyers be admitted to court?” he asks. “Experts are as cancer to any lay 
body.” Instead, he advocates, as an admittedly hard-to-realize ideal, a victim-oriented court, 
constituted out of local community members, and focused on assessment of the victim‟s 
situation and on restitution to him, ideally by the offender himself. Punishment of the 
offender would be required only where his “constructive” sufferings through restitutive 
actions were felt to be insufficient to meet the sentiments of the local community.
26
 
We should note that Christie himself, writing in the nineteen-seventies, does not 
conceive of criminal cases as the private property of individuals; their ownership should, in 
his view, be “shared” by the neighborhood, and it is precisely this sharing that is the benign 
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service of his ideal, community-based court.
27
 But it is clear how readily this notion of 
neighborhood “ownership” could dissolve under the influence of a more assertively 
individualistic culture, especially since, once the idea is established that the participants 
should retrieve their conflict from the grasp of the state and its professionals, it is hard to 
explain why they should then surrender it to their neighbors. It is notable that some, though 
not all, of the victim comments quoted by Erez appeal strongly to this sense of personal 
ownership. 
More recently, Renee Zaubermann (2000) has drawn attention to the ways in which 
both individuals and organizations have “instrumentalized” criminal justice for their own 
purposes, reporting a crime to the authorities when they foresee advantage from doing so, 
while adopting alternative strategies if they do not. It is not far from this to the perception of 
criminal justice as a service, available for optional use like any other public service. Like 
Dubber, Zaubermann does not so much engage with arguments for the wholly public 
conception, as identify it with the asserted authority of the sovereign state (historically 
originating in the personal sovereignty of a monarch) as against other political forces. 
Similarly, much discussion of victim rights in criminology draws on a vision of criminal 
justice as a space in which competing agencies struggle for influence, the courts and the legal 
profession being perceived as excessively dominant and the victims, like the offenders, in 
pressing need of agencies to assert their interests. Advocates of restorative justice often strike 
a similar note. Charles Barton, for example, criticizes the Justices of the New Zealand Court 
of Appeal who, in The Queen v. Clotworthy (1998), overturned the District Court‟s decision 
to accept agreed compensation to a victim in lieu of a custodial sentence for the offender, 
giving priority to the public interest in “consistency, integrity of the criminal justice system 
and deterrence of others” over the wishes of victim and offender.28 Barton comments that  
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rather than showing respect to the wishes of the primary stakeholders, and especially 
those of the victim, they presumed to know better how the case should be resolved. . . . 
Judgments such as this only succeed in supporting calls for a substantial and urgent 





The salient points here are the imputation to the “professionals” of defective 
understanding, implicitly grounded in the arrogance of their professionalism itself (“they 
presumed to know better”); and the market-liberal model contained in the repeated use of 
“stakeholders”: a business expression that has been gradually colonizing political and public-
service discourse over the last decade or two.
30
 
In short, insofar as they acknowledge at all the arguments for the wholly public 
conception, commentators sympathetic to victims‟ voices tend to treat them as merely 
strategic justifications for state power and the authority of the courts, or as necessarily 
yielding at least some ground to the victims‟ right of “ownership.” The implicit slogan is: 
“the crime belongs to the victim, not to the officials of the state.” As we shall see, the same 
conception emerges elsewhere in the case for VIS.  
V The restoration of ‘balance’ 
I turn now to the second question. Erez‟s respondents were not alone in suggesting the need 
to correct the “unequal balance” between victim and offender, in part through the 
introduction of VIS. This metaphor of “balancing,” as between the respective interests of the 
individual offender and victim, or between the legal rights of accused persons and the 
“rights” of the wider population, is extensively used in the wider political and media 
discourse, always with the prior claim, or implication, of an existing imbalance in the 
criminal justice system in favor of the offender or alleged offender.
31
 Whatever the general 
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merits of such claims, we are concerned here specifically with the arguments for allowing 
victim input as part of the “rebalancing” strategy.  
Two quite different aims of the “rebalancing” campaign need to be distinguished. One, 
corresponding to the justice-based justification of victim input, is to ensure that the accused 
does not benefit unduly, in the determination of his punishment, from what one might call 
superior communicative entitlement as compared to the victim. The underlying assumption 
here is that, prior to the introduction of VIS, the accused has enjoyed an unwarranted 
superiority of communicative entitlement. The other aim, corresponding to the welfare-based 
justification, is to ensure so far as possible that the presumed victim is not further afflicted by 
the experience of the criminal justice process itself, and indeed to offer him or her 
opportunities for healing and compensation wherever this is feasible. The underlying 
assumption here is that, for many victims, their experience of the criminal justice process is 
that it adds further affliction rather than bringing healing, and that they are accorded less 
respect, care, and considerate attention than the accused. 
The arguments that follow later in this section are directed primarily against the 
justice-based justification. Clearly the welfare-based justification is confirmed by the 
experiences of many victims, and no-one could reasonably deny that -provided these do not 
compromise the pursuit of a just verdict and proper sentencing- efforts at comfort, healing, 
and restoration of self-respect for the victim should be made. These might include the victim 
statement, understood not as a medium for supplementary evidence, but as an opportunity to 
express damned-up feelings to an attentive and sympathetic audience, and to make a public 
affirmation of important personal values that have been outraged by the crime. For example, 
the court in a recent domestic child abuse case in Australia, having heard amid other 
harrowing evidence that the father had violated his younger daughter with the hilt of a 
hunting knife, probably did not need, as information, to be told in the clichéd phrasing of a 
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VIS that the children‟s “home life was rotten to its dysfunctional core.”32 But it is entirely 
credible that such a statement by a victim could have therapeutic value. It could help the 
victim to dissociate herself, through the rhetoric of vivid condemnation, from memories that 
might threaten to enslave her psychologically and to engender irrational guilt. And it might 
bring her the relief that is often achieved when a hitherto private anguish is brought under a 
widely-recognized public concept (“dysfunctional family”), and we feel that we are not 
unique in our suffering, and that there is a system of ideas that embraces it. The cliché is itself 
comforting. 
The difficulty in accepting the welfare case for VIS lies with the proviso about preserving 
justice. It is precisely in respect of VIS, as contrasted with other devices of victim support, 
that the distinction between enhancing victim welfare and achieving just punishment of the 
crime is most difficult to sustain in practice. The discourse both of the “rebalancing” 
campaign, and of victim statements themselves, often conspicuously fails to distinguish a 
therapeutic aim from an aim of achieving justice. How, for example, should we interpret this 
passage? 
 
I am grateful that this legal part of my brother's death will soon be over. I have realized 
that no plea, no sentence, no punishment is really going to make me feel better. My 
brother is still dead, and my family still has to deal with his violent death. . . . No 
length of incarceration will take the pain away from my family. No sentence will bring 




The statement voices grief and suffering, and affirms the solidarity of the surviving family 
members: in the very act of denying the possibility of consolation, it perhaps achieves a small 
alleviation of pain, if only through the dignity of its utterance. At first, it seems also to 
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disclaim any voice in the punishment of the killer: “no punishment is really going to make me 
feel better.” But that “really” is already a crucial qualification. “No sentence will bring my 
brother back” can imply either “I am indifferent to any sentence” or “No sentence can be long 
enough to equate to my loss.” On the latter reading, the denial of any quest for retaliatory 
satisfaction is a mere preamble to the final hint that (for implied reasons of balance—we have 
received a life sentence) the offender should receive the maximum punishment available. 
Such multiple ambiguities of meaning and purpose—and this example is hardly an unusual 
one—make it difficult to accept that a therapeutic “rebalancing” as between offender and 
victim can be carried out without at the same time allowing the victim a communicative 
entitlement that requires support from the justice-based “rebalancing” argument. To this I 
now turn. 
 
There are two main justice-based arguments that use the balancing metaphor. The first 
maintains that victim input can inform a process of restitutive justice, repairing or 
compensating the harm suffered by the victim, and so correcting, or mitigating, the 
unbalanced distribution of goods and harms created by the crime. The second relates 
specifically to the sentencing phase, and justifies the presentation of evidence about the 
impact of the crime on the victim on the grounds that it “balances” evidence about the 
offender‟s character and history presented in mitigation. I shall discuss each in turn. 
Intuitively, a crime often does place an offender at an advantage relative to the victim. 
The clearest examples are economic crimes such as theft, burglary or vandalism. Restoring 
the status quo ante by reimbursing the victim at the offender‟s expense, where this is 
practicable, can plausibly be said to restore a balance. But even with these crimes, direct 
financial restitution has only limited restitutive power. There is more to suffering criminal 
damage, for example, than a financial loss. If I find my car tires slashed, I am unlikely to feel 
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that equilibrium has been restored merely by the reimbursement of the costs of replacing the 
tires: I have to cope with a psychological harm, the awareness of the hostility or contempt 
that motivated the act.  
Considerations of this kind have led writers such as David Hershenov (1999) to 
suggest that the gratification of feelings of revenge can provide restitution where financial 
compensation fails: that the victim may be satisfied that the imbalance has been corrected if 
she can see that the offender has had her “comfort level” lowered proportionately to the harm 
done by her offense.  
A case for victim input for purposes of balance could perhaps be made along 
Hershenov‟s lines. On this view, once we have moved beyond the kinds of financial harms 
that can readily be documented, we will need advice from the victim if we are to assess 
correctly the type or level of discomfort that the offender will have to endure in order to 
correct the imbalance of harms.  
To justify such an approach, we would need to have great confidence in the ability of 
the courts to elicit an objective quotient of harm from VIE. Moreover, it is controversial, to 
say the least, that punishment should be proportional to the harm caused, rather than to the 
blameworthiness of the offender‟s action,34 let alone calibrated to correct any remaining 
imbalance of comfort as between victim and offender. If, indeed, the actual imbalance 
between these two individuals had to be redressed, then the aim of equal punishment for 
objectively comparable cases would have to be abandoned in favor of a strict calibration of 
punishment to the distress of the particular victim, who may be either more or less than 
averagely sensitive. I return to this point in VI below. 
Unsurprisingly, most advocacy of enhanced victim input for reasons of “balance” 
does not demand this kind of scrupulous rebalancing of harms and discomforts in the ultimate 
outcome. Rather, it suggests that in its process of determining just punishment, the court must 
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receive appropriately “balanced” input to its deliberations from the respective voices (actual 
or representative) of offender and victim. Hitherto, it is supposed, there has been an 
imbalance in favor of the offender. 
The difficulty here is to see how any new communicative entitlement granted to the 
victim (such as the right to a VS) could credibly be described as restoring a disrupted 
“balance” in relation to a communicative entitlement of the accused, since, under the current 
criminal justice process, these two parties are in asymmetric positions, with disparate 
communicative needs. The accused is on trial, facing the threat of punishment, and needs to 
communicate his defense point by point in response to the prosecution‟s case; the victim, in 
contrast, has an ancillary role and may not even be present throughout the proceedings. The 
victim‟s ordinary (non-VIE) evidence may already “balance,” in the sense of countering, 
some assertion of the defense; and with the arguable exception of mitigation (see below), 
other communications by the accused have no obvious equivalent from the victim‟s side. To 
achieve comprehensive “balance” in communicative entitlement, the process itself would 
need to change, so that offender and victim would indeed become the antagonists, or at any 
rate equal parties in that “three-cornered contest” model repudiated by the Irish Minister of 
Justice. In that situation, both would require full-scale legal representation and, in principle, 
equal air time. The metaphor of victim-offender balance, in short, presupposes, when applied 
to communicative entitlements, the substitution of an individually adversarial for the wholly 
public conception of the criminal justice process.
35
 
The main focus of this second argument for allowing victim input as part of a 
balancing strategy is the claim that VIS offers an appropriate counter to mitigation evidence, 
that, uncorrected, provides an unfair advantage to the defense at the sentencing stage. Here, at 
least as far as the United States is concerned, the accusation of “law bowing to politics” is as 
old as the Supreme Court decision in Payne v Tennessee (1991), which held that the Eighth 
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Amendment did not bar juries in capital sentencing cases from considering, alongside 
evidence presented in mitigation, VIE of the victim‟s character and the emotional impact of 
the murder on the victim‟s family. On that occasion, both sides alluded to the influence of 
victims‟ rights campaigns on the majority opinion.36 The constitutional arguments are 
complex, and much of the debate lies beyond the scope of this paper;
37
 I focus here simply on 
the powerful rhetorical role played by the appeal for restoration of balance between the 
voices of criminal and victim. Joshua D. Greenberg quotes the words of the Supreme Court 
of Tennessee. 
 
It is an affront to the civilized members of the human race to say that at sentencing . . . 
a parade of witnesses may praise the background, character and good deeds of 
Defendant . . . but nothing may be said that bears upon the character of, or the harms 




If we conceive the court as a theatre in which two rivals, personally or by proxy, 
strive to assert their dignity, this claim has force; the problem lies in its application to the 
specific drama of sentencing. It is true that some of the arguments for excluding or 
constraining VIS at the sentencing stage are symmetrically applicable to mitigation. As 
Greenberg points out, critics of VIS object that its power to influence sentencing may depend 
on whether the victim or victim‟s survivors are articulate enough to express their experiences 
and feelings effectively to the court (which may in turn depend on their being socially or 
ethnically similar to the judge or jury). But the same applies to statements in mitigation by 
the defendant‟s allies: a defendant with middle-class, university-educated family and friends 
is likely, all else being equal, to benefit from more persuasive mitigation statements than an 
unloved drifter. Concerns over the difficulty in maintaining consistency from case to case in 
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However, these similarities between certain arguments applicable to the two types of 
evidence do not mean that mitigation and VIS should properly be regarded as balancing one 
another. Indeed, as others have pointed out, they are radically different.
40
 Mitigation 
statements do not, for the most part, concern themselves at all with the harm suffered by the 
victim. They typically assert the defendant‟s general good character, or cite his remorse, co-
operation with the police, or good conduct as a prisoner. Their characteristic aim is to 
convince those responsible for deciding on the appropriate sentence that the particular crime 
has been an aberration by an essentially good (or at least, less bad than the crime might 
suggest) individual; or, more abstrusely, but not uncommonly where there is a long delay 
between crime and punishment, that the person now facing punishment is less dangerous, or 
more morally regenerate, than the person who committed the crime.
41
 Evidence as to the 
harm suffered by the victim or her associates or survivors cannot relevantly “counter” such 
claims at all. The true „counter‟ would be evidence of the defendant‟s generally bad character, 
lack of remorse, and so forth.  
Direct contradiction between mitigation and VIS would arise only if the mitigation 
statement attempted to minimize the harm sustained by the victim, or if the VIS assailed the 
defendant‟s wider character or conduct, over and above the crime itself. If the idea of VIS 
and mitigation “balancing” one another was enshrined in the criminal justice process, it is 
conceivable that such counter-arguing (and counter-counter-arguing?) would be attempted; if 
this were to occur, the distinctive functions of mitigation and of VIS would come to subserve 
a contest between two individuals (or their representatives) each seeking to position himself, 
on a spectrum of “deserving” character, as favorably, relative to the other, as the most 
generous construal of the evidence will allow.  
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The Supreme Court judges who upheld the constitutionality of VIS in capital cases 
sometimes invoked an idea that seems to be intended to fend off the objection that VIS turns 
public criminal justice into a private combat between individuals. This is the idea that victim 
impact evidence can demonstrate “the particularized harm that an individual‟s murder causes 
to the rest of society” [italics added].42 This function of VIE may be interpreted as a response 
to the mitigation evidence that suggests that the offender is of sufficient actual or potential 
worth to society to merit being kept alive. Yet even in this aspect, VIE is not truly „counter‟ 
to mitigation evidence. For however great the loss to society caused by the death of a 
homicide victim, this cannot affect the question whether the killer‟s death will represent an 
unacceptable loss of worth to society. If worth to others is the criterion to be considered, then 
the loss of a person even of very high worth to others does not provide a reason for the 
removal of a person of lower worth. Once more, the true counter to mitigation in this regard 
would be evidence that the offender is of lower worth to society than the defense claims, not 
evidence of the superior worth of the victim. 
As Greenberg remarks, the persuasiveness of the Tennessee Supreme Court‟s 
statement is more political than judicial. It rests on a presupposition that “the criminal justice 
system neglects crime victims while privileging defendants,”43 implying that every 
opportunity must be taken to give the victim a voice. More fundamentally still, it implicitly 
presents judicial proceedings as a contest for entitlements between two individuals, even at 
the point at which the specific purpose of the proceeding is to determine the punishment of 
one individual alone.  
VI The determination of just punishment 
The third question arises from the use of strict VIE. According to strict VIE as I have defined 
it, evidence of the impact of the crime on the victim and those closely connected to her is 
presented for the better information of the court, on the same footing as clinical or financial 
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evidence of the consequences of the crime, and without implying any special expressive role 
for the victim in the court proceedings. It would be just as acceptable if the same evidence 
could be presented impersonally, without any participation at all by the victim. 
An immediate criticism of this conception is that, if the VIE is impersonal in this 
sense, it is not clear why a separate ritual of presenting it should be needed, nor why it should 
be presented at a separate point, such as the sentencing phase. Why should all evidence of the 
consequences of the crime not be presented at once? Indeed, is it not only when all 
consequences have been spelt out that we can understand precisely what the crime has been? 
In answer to this last question, we need to recall that a criminal offense is defined in 
terms that specify or imply certain types of actions having certain types of consequence, but 
do not specify or imply other consequences that are nevertheless entirely possible in 
particular cases. For an action to constitute murder or manslaughter, for example, it must be a 
consequence of the offender‟s actions that someone is dead. But there is not a distinct offense 
of “causing the death of the best Heldentenor of his generation, thus diminishing the pleasure 
of audiences at the Bayreuth festival for the next twenty years.” Such consequences are not 
sufficiently generic to form part of the definition of an offense. We therefore maintain a 
distinction between those consequences of the defendant‟s actions that must be proved in 
order to establish that the offense has occurred, and various other consequences that may 
influence our more refined judgment of the offender‟s blameworthiness.  
Let us suppose that M murders V, who happens to be the father of several young 
children and the leading Heldentenor of his generation. We will find it useful to distinguish 
the following:  
A Direct consequences of the defendant‟s action that are a condition of the occurrence 
of the offense. 
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B Direct consequences of this type of action that are a condition of the definition of 
the offense. 
 
C Indirect consequences of the defendant‟s action that he in fact foresaw. 
 
D Indirect consequences of the defendant‟s action that he did not in fact foresee. 
 
E Indirect consequences of this type of action, of a kind that could be expected to be 
foreseen by any reasonable and averagely well-informed person. 
 
F Indirect consequences of this type of action, of a kind that could not be expected to 
have been foreseen by any reasonable and averagely well-informed person. 
 
If we apply these to the Heldentenor case, the A and B consequences are the same: that 
someone dies. These make the case one of homicide. The difference is simply between token 
and type. 
C consequences might, in principle, influence our sense of the heinousness of the 
crime. If M knew he was creating grieving orphans or disappointed opera-goers, and 
especially if he intended to do so as well as to deprive V of his life, this could only increase 
his blameworthiness, since he would have envisaged, or even aimed at, additional suffering 
for additional victims. Conversely, therefore, if (D consequences) M did not know that V was 
a parent or a singer, we might condemn him a little less. But evidence to support such 
judgments at a trial could not be presented as VIE. It would be necessary to show, not 
whether in fact V had children who suffered, but whether M knew that V had children who 
would suffer.  
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E consequences form the basis of most attempts to reflect in punishment the harm 
done by a crime. Reflecting the principles (i) that crimes and their legal penalties should be 
publicly promulgated and (ii) that agents should be held responsible only for those 
consequences of their actions that they could reasonably have been expected to foresee, the 
courts take account, not so much of the C and D indirect consequences of the actual crime, as 
of the type of consequences (E) that predictably follow this type of act. Generalizing in this 
way establishes a norm that can be applied to all cases; it invokes an understanding of the 
seriousness of a given type of crime that is expected to be shared by all mentally competent 
citizens. (And this shared understanding is partly what justifies the law‟s prohibiting the 
offense, and the severity of the penalties applied to it.) A reasonable person should be 
expected to foresee emotional distress to a murder victim‟s family and friends, and this 
expectation is folded in, so to speak, to our assessment of the heinousness of this type of 
crime. But just for that reason, E consequences do not require any special kind of evidence. 
Indeed they function morally even if, in the particular case, the relevant consequences did not 
occur. The murderer should not, where E consequences are reflected, be punished more 
lightly because, as a matter of fact, V has no family or friends to grieve for him; his 
blameworthiness reflects the fact that there might have been grieving survivors, and he could 
reasonably be expected to have been aware of this possibility. Conversely—so far as E 
consequences are concerned—he should not punished more severely because the grief of the 
survivors is especially intense or widespread. 
But just as a reasonable person qua potential murderer is assumed to be able to 
foresee certain possible indirect consequences of the type of act he commits, so a reasonable 
person qua judge or jury member is assumed to be able to foresee them. Therefore, to secure 
a just level of punishment, no special presentation of evidence is required. A special 
presentation would be needed only if it were true that 
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E1 Judges and jury members (where the latter participate in sentencing decisions) are, 
in consequence of their roles, especially deficient in the capacity to understand and 
take account of E consequences. 
 
We would need very strong arguments to support E1, since it amounts to saying that those 
expectations (of insight into foreseeable consequences of certain types of action) that the 
courts apply to offenders cannot be assumed to be met by the courts themselves. 
F consequences ought to be set aside by the same arguments that endorse the use of E 
consequences. If a particular consequence (such as the declining standards of singing at 
Bayreuth) is not of a type that could have been foreseen to result from this type of act, then (i) 
it could not have entered even implicitly into the public promulgation of murder as an offense 
meriting penalties of a certain severity; and (ii) to punish the offender specifically for causing 
this consequence would be unfairly to hold an agent criminally responsible for a consequence 
of his action that he could not reasonably be expected to have foreseen. 
This last point is perhaps controversial. Jurists and philosophers have debated 
the propriety of allowing the severity of punishment to reflect „consequential moral luck‟: 
consequences less severe or more severe than might have been expected. This question 
cannot be explored in all its bearings here.
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 The crucial point for our current discussion is 
that we do not need to reject argument (ii), and move in the direction of strict liability for 
consequences, in order to hold serious offenders to account for serious indirect consequential 
harms. Any reasonable and averagely well-informed person knows that the potential range 
and seriousness of the indirect consequences of murder are very great. The epistemic 
obligation—the duty to draw on one‟s knowledge of the world to envisage possible 
consequences—rightly weighs very heavily on the person who intentionally kills. Admittedly, 
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no-one randomly murdering a stranger could specifically predict that he would be the world‟s 
leading Heldentenor, or the lone parent of six children, or a cancer specialist on the brink of a 
major research breakthrough; but anyone should realize that the murder of another human 
being might have unexpectedly wide-ranging, painful or long-lasting consequences. It is not 
like the unexpectedness of stealing, and then throwing away, a cigarette packet that turns out 
to have contained a priceless jewel in a secret compartment. 
Just because the potential range and seriousness of the indirect consequences of 
murder is sufficiently predictable, we can reflect that range in our punitive judgment of the 
crime of murder in general. We hold murder to be a very bad crime, not only because it 
deprives one person of her life, but also because it typically causes great collateral suffering. 
And this is taken to be a matter of common understanding: we expect that the offender will 
be aware of it, and we expect that judges and jury members will be aware of it. We would 
need a very strong argument to set aside this latter expectation, since it would amount to 
saying that the expectations that the courts apply to offenders could not be applied to the 
courts themselves.  
There is therefore no need, in order to reflect in punishment the heinousness of a 
crime, for a special presentation of evidence of the particular harm suffered by the victim or 
her survivors, unless this harm is even more serious than that which (in the form of the 
predictable range and seriousness of the potential consequences of this type of crime) should 
be assumed to be a matter of common understanding.
45
  
Because the predictable range of harms caused by murder are so dreadful, this need to 
learn of particular harms is easier to imagine with crimes less serious and far-reaching than 
murder. If T steals and discards V‟s specially adapted cigarette packet, it may be as much of a 
surprise to the court as to T that it contained a priceless jewel representing most of V‟s wealth. 
The court might need victim impact evidence to inform it of this indirect consequence. Such 
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consequences do not fall within the predictable range and seriousness of the potential 
consequences of such petty theft, and so the standard punishments for theft do not sufficiently 
reflect them. But in these cases, the force of our concerns over consequential moral luck 
seems especially strong. It would be unjust to punish the thief more severely because of a 
consequence he could not reasonably be expected to have foreseen or (which is the same 
thing) the possibility of which is not part of the understanding of this type of crime that ought 
be assumed to be shared among all citizens.  
In short, if the court can assess for itself the heinousness of the crime by referring to 
the predictable range and seriousness of the potential consequences of this type of crime, it 
does not need VIE. If there are more serious consequential harms from this offense than the 
predictable range would encompass, the court might learn something from VIE; but it would 
then be unjust to punish the offender more severely on account of that information, since this 
would be holding him accountable for a duty to envisage consequences that those authorizing 
the punishment could not themselves normally have envisaged.  
The principle underlying this conclusion is that criminal responsibility and eligibility 
for punishment are bounded by common understandings—by our capability of deploying 
knowledge that is accessible to and is shared, or ought to be expected to be shared, by all 
citizens. (Criminal responsibility is correspondingly diminished in the case of those incapable 
of achieving or deploying such knowledge.) And the two premises that would legitimize the 
special presentation of VIE in spite of the arguments presented above have in common their 
rejection of this principle. One is E1, the claim that the courts cannot be trusted to understand 
“consequences of a type of crime of a kind that could be expected to be foreseen by any 
reasonable and averagely well-informed person.” According to this claim, the courts would 
need the special presentation of VIE in order to bring them up from their defective level of 
understanding to that of a reasonable and averagely well-informed person, such as the 
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offender is expected to be when held accountable for his crime. Though unlikely, perhaps, to 
be believed by professionals within the criminal justice system, this claim has its adherents 
among the general public and in the media, convinced that courts and especially judges are 
“removed from the community” and in need of continual reminders of the serious 
consequences of crime.
46
 The continual exposure to evidence of crimes is presumed to 
desensitize the courts to individual instances, rather than to inform consistent judgment 
across cases in general. The best proof that this view exists and has influence is that judges 
and criminal lawyers themselves defensively acknowledge it.
47
 
The second is the claim that E consequences, defined as they are in terms of types of 
action and types of consequences, are an insufficient or inappropriate basis for determining 
punishment; that actual consequences of the particular crime, even if they are less or more 
severe than the average, should calibrate punishment. VIE is necessary, according to this 
claim, because it helps the courts to fix punishment to counterbalance more precisely the 
actual suffering of the particular victim. As Hershenov says of victims who happen to have 
suffered particularly badly, or cannot be financially compensated, “since they were hurt more, 
they need more compensation” (that is, in the form of more severe punishment of their 
afflicter).
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 But to go beyond E consequences in this way—and this is precisely the role that 
VIE can play—is to move from a conception of criminal liability as founded in common 
understandings that are expected to be shared by all competent citizens, to a conception much 
closer to that of civil liability, in which actual “loss” must be compensated. On this point, 
there is evidence that the claim is supported, not only explicitly by certain philosophers, but 
implicitly by some criminal justice professionals, since the guidance to victims on completing 
victim impact statements commonly encourages a specification of losses reminiscent of an 





VII The two presuppositions and their political basis 
The analyses in the three preceding sections all point in the same direction. The arguments 
for enhanced victim input into the criminal justice process itself are open to significant 
objections, unless they are reinforced by the acceptance of two tacit presuppositions.  
Presupposition one is a conception of society as a collection of individuals seeking, 
and entitled to, their due. This in turn yields a vision of criminal justice, not as the realm of 
steadfastly maintained objective and public norms, but as a field of interpersonal conflict, a 
battle among individuals for relative advantage, recognition, influence and other goods. The 
crime victim is no longer conceived as a citizen with an interest in criminal justice identical 
to that of all other citizens (though happening to be the occasion of one specific prosecution, 
and in addition having certain specific welfare needs). Rather, he or she is conceived as an 
individual contesting power over, or “ownership” of, “her” case with another individual, the 
defendant.  
Presupposition two is that the courts (meaning judges and jury members) are less well 
equipped than the averagely reasonable and well-informed person to weigh for themselves 
the enormity of the type of crime prosecuted before them. Confronted, for example, with an 
act of mass murder, they cannot be left to imagine for themselves the kind and degree of 
harm that it might have done—even though they expect the offender, unless excused from the 
epistemic responsibilities of an averagely reasonable and well-informed person, to have 
imagined it, since on just those terms they are holding him criminally responsible for it. It is 
not enough for the courts to know that the corpses of small children had to be dug out of a 
bombed building; they need to hear expressly of the agony of rescue workers, who noticed 
that one dead child had a teddy bear on his shirt, another a brick embedded in her head.
50
 Or, 
on the side of leniency, they need to hear a victim‟s survivor point out that “My dad is gone 
now, and there is nothing that can make that enormous loss whole.”51 The enhancement of 
 36 
their insufficient imaginings by this kind of especially vivid testimony is supposed to assist 
them in judging whether, for example, the harm done by mass murder justifies a death 
penalty, or merely life imprisonment.  
Whether these two presuppositions are defensible cannot be resolved here. The first 
involves a radical claim about the nature of criminal law; the second is an empirical 
proposition to be investigated by sociologists or psychologists. What is clear is that they are 
more likely to be believed, or half-believed, by the general public, at least within Anglophone 
jurisdictions, today than a generation ago. The reasons for this are, once more, a sociological 
question, but some clue may be given by two common factors that the presuppositions 
possess. Firstly, the assertion of their truth disparages the public realm. Presupposition one 
rejects the wholly public conception of criminal justice in favor of an individualistic and 
competitive model reminiscent of economic liberalism. Presupposition two says that people 
who take up public roles are, to the extent that they fall into their role, to be especially 
suspected of being out of touch with human reality. 
The second common factor is that both presuppositions are entrenched in the attitudes 
and practices of the mass media.
52
 The clichés of victim impact and opinion statements 
delivered in court echo those delivered by (or elicited from) victims or their survivors in 
media interviews. In jurisdictions where the most severe penalty for murder is literal life 
imprisonment, the grieving survivors of a murder victim will often say—we have already 
seen an example—that they themselves have been “condemned to a life sentence.” Some of 
them, at least, must now be saying it because they have heard others say the same on 
television.
53
 Those pronouncements in turn echo, or are echoed by, leader-writers and 
columnists whose mission is to campaign for the decent person to get his or her due. The 
courts become most visible in this discourse when they are perceived as obstructing the 
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decent person‟s quest, either through fussy adherence to legal technicalities, or because of 
failures of human sympathy from the bench.  
To a certain extent this orientation of the media is inevitable because of the internal 
imperatives of broadcasting and print journalism. Competing for market share, the media 
need vivid human stories, and they need them as quickly as the risk of contempt of court will 
allow; and they need heroes, victims and villains pitted against one another, rather than the 
patient and dispassionate application of doctrines and norms. Judges, professionally obligated 
to pursue the latter, looking beyond the excitements of the individual case, are always liable 
to appear to understate the human factor. Juries permanently sworn to secrecy, as in the UK, 
must also be a source of frustration. (Hence the eagerness with which the press seizes on 
incidents of weeping or fainting among jury members.)  
But the explanation, I believe, is ideological as well as commercial. In the main 
Anglophone societies, even the conservative media, most conspicuously represented by the 
Murdoch empire, are philosophically anti-statist. While more likely than the left-wing media 
to support specific measures of “strong government,” especially in foreign affairs and in the 
fight against crime, they are at least as suspicious as their leftist colleagues of the public 
establishment and those who populate it. Thus the legitimate activity of the media in holding 
political leaders and public servants to account hardens into a model of society as divided 
between the world of established institutions, including the courts, and the world of human 
flesh and blood. The individual crime victim marginalized by the legal establishment fits 
perfectly into this picture. The greatly enhanced political possibility of VIS over the last 
quarter-century may owe as much to its concurrence with this development, as to changes in 
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